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| author | Dennis Brentjes <dennis@brentj.es> | 2018-09-04 19:28:20 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dennis Brentjes <dennis@brentj.es> | 2018-09-07 00:21:35 +0200 |
| commit | 4cf29b0c3beacafd8565ca5461381f53832688ed (patch) | |
| tree | d70c95146ca8d72eb9017fce0e9c3e2e88308472 /content/related_work.tex | |
| parent | 1e316c9a7437580f499453cdafbb0c7433a46b88 (diff) | |
| download | thesis-master.tar.gz thesis-master.tar.bz2 thesis-master.zip | |
Diffstat (limited to 'content/related_work.tex')
| -rw-r--r-- | content/related_work.tex | 8 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/content/related_work.tex b/content/related_work.tex index 7dd41f9..7c5ade0 100644 --- a/content/related_work.tex +++ b/content/related_work.tex @@ -1,11 +1,11 @@ \section{Related work} \label{sec:related} -The \cmix network uses raw \elgamal encryption and we try to benchmark the performance of using either multiplicative group or elliptic curve variants. Within the field of benchmarking mix networks and \elgamal implementations some work has already been done. But most of the work is about comparing elliptic curve cryptography with RSA. Which unfortunately is not that interesting for us. +The \cmix{} network uses raw \elgamal{} encryption and we try to benchmark the performance of using either multiplicative group or elliptic curve variants. Within the field of benchmarking mix networks and \elgamal{} implementations some work has already been done. But most of the work is about comparing elliptic curve cryptography with RSA. Which unfortunately is not that interesting for our benchmark. -A paper by Osman Ugus, Alban Hessler and Dirk Westhoff \cite{ugus2007performance} shows that additive homomorphic EC-\elgamal Encryption has its merits within sensor networks. +A paper by Osman Ugus, Alban Hessler and Dirk Westhoff \cite{ugus2007performance} shows that additive homomorphic EC-\elgamal{} Encryption has its merits within sensor networks. They implemented the encryption scheme on a small 8 bit CPU platform, the \emph{MicaZ mote}, and benchmarked 500 runs of the encryption scheme to get their results. They show that they can run their benchmark in just over a second which makes it, according to them, the fastest implementation on that platform at that time. -In a paper by Rosy Sunuwar and Suraj Ketan Samal\cite{sunuwar2015elgamal} they compare classical symmetric encryption schemes against elliptic curve \elgamal. They show that EC-\elgamal is relatively slow, but propose a fix by introducing $E^3C^2K$ algorithm. The algorithm in itself might not be interesting for us. The results of their comparison with standard symmetric encryption schemes, for both encryption and decryption is. It shows the relative slowness of decryption compared to encryption of standard EC-\elgamal +In a paper by Rosy Sunuwar and Suraj Ketan Samal\cite{sunuwar2015elgamal} they compare classical symmetric encryption schemes against elliptic curve \elgamal{}. They show that EC-\elgamal{} is relatively slow, but propose a fix by introducing $E^3C^2K$ algorithm. The algorithm in itself might not be interesting for this research paper. The results of their comparison with standard symmetric encryption schemes, for both encryption and decryption is. It shows the relative slowness of decryption compared to encryption of standard EC-\elgamal{}. -and finally the paper by Ye Zhu et al.\cite{zhu2004flow} not only describes the flow analysis attacks that effects all mix networks, but also benchmarks them to show that mitigating the found attacks can be done without losing too much performance. They use the total time of a mix for specific mix network as a metric. This is useful for them because they are only interested in the bigger picture of the network performance. For this research we want to be able to zoom in on specific phases if need be to inspect what is causing the slow down and if that is something implementation specific or a fundamental problem of the cryptographic primitives being used.
\ No newline at end of file +Finally the paper by Ye Zhu et al.\cite{zhu2004flow} not only describes the flow analysis attacks that effects all mix networks, but also benchmarks them to show that mitigating the found attacks can be done without losing too much performance. They use the total time of a mix for specific mix network as a metric. This is useful for them because they are only interested in the bigger picture of the network performance. For this research we want to zoom in on specific phases and/or parts if need be. Enabling us to inspect what is causing the slow down and investigate if that slow down is caused by something implementation specific or some fundamental problem of the cryptographic primitives being used.
\ No newline at end of file |
